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Microfinance Impact and The MDGs: The Challenge of Scaling-up
Martin Greeley
Summary
This paper concerns the potential for microfinance to make a difference in achievement of the
Millennium Development Goals. It recognises that microfinance can contribute to several MDGs but
that to do so in ways that make a real difference would involve a significant scaling-up of microfinance
service provision. Herein lies the challenge. The expansion of developing country microfinance services is
increasingly driven by commercial investors who do not usually assess Microfinance Institution (MFI) per-
formance according to MDG criteria. At best, they will use some fairly loose ‘social’ criteria often bor-
rowed from the corporate social responsibility literature; or they may refer, usually without precision, to
a double bottom line of financial and social performance. These have little or nothing to do with
achievement of the MDGs. As the empirical material presented makes clear, MFIs that do not deliber-
ately and rigorously target poor households are unlikely to make any difference to MDG attainment.
MFIs with a social mission focused on poverty reduction (MDG1) face a genuine difficulty. To expand
coverage of poor households, they generally need to seek financial support, usually in the form of loans
or equity. Their difficulty is that they face a serious risk of ‘mission drift’, concentrating on achieving an
outstanding financial performance, which is necessary anyway and especially if they wish to access com-
mercial funds, and neglecting their social mission. In other words, commercial funding may mean less
attention to poor households in microfinance service delivery. The challenge for the industry is to man-
age scaling-up without losing sight of its social purposes. The paper argues for client-level assessment
by MFIs that can both ensure that poor households are targeted and that microfinance impact on their
poverty status can be monitored. Developing a social performance monitoring system based on client
assessment is the principal way in which MFI impact on the MDGs can be established and maintained.
Keywords: microfinance, poverty, Millennium Development Goals, scaling-up, social performance, tar-
geting, monitoring.
Martin Greeley is a Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex. He is an Economist and
works on poverty and public policy. He has published extensively on microfinance and this paper was
first presented in New Delhi in April 2005 at a conference organised by CARE, India.
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1 For example, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the eight million plus borrowers from MFIs in Bangladesh have indeed had 
some collective social and economic impact on markets or values or other dimensions affecting wellbeing.
1 Introduction
The context for this paper is twofold. First, the belief, a very reasonable one, that microfinance has the
potential to help achieve the MDGs. Secondly, the knowledge that to realise this potential in a mean-
ingful way requires a substantial scaling up of microfinance service provision. 
This is the global context. South Asia provides most of the evidence and most of the client numbers
that inform debate on MDG impact. South Asia has had a high growth rate in client numbers and has
high growth potential. Elsewhere also there has been sustained growth, through a variety of institu-
tional models. Context has a strong effect on both MDG impact potential and growth potential but, in
different contexts, Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) have demonstrated that they can deliver sustainable
services that contribute to the achievement of the MDGs.
This evidence has been reviewed elsewhere and is only discussed briefly here. In this paper the focus is
more on the challenges of improving the evidence base. The point here is that, relative to the scale of
MFI service provision, we know relatively little in a reliable form about the social and economic impacts
of MFIs. The second part of the paper then relates this to the challenges of scaling up in ways that
encourage achievement of the MDGs. It argues that both for the achievement of the MDGs and for
sustainable scaling up, collecting, managing and using knowledge about clients are core organisational
strategies for MFIs. 
The paper draws in part on the work of 30 MFIs who have been partners in the Ford Foundation-fund-
ed Imp-Act action research programme. CYSD, SHARE and PRADAN from India were all very active
participants. Although that global programme did not specifically address the MDGs, the focus of the
programme findings, on the need, and means, to strengthen MFI social performance management, is
underlined through the arguments here. In summary there are two arguments. First, we do not know
enough at present to assess the contribution of MFI programmes to the MDGs. Secondly, MFI success
in providing sustained financial services derives from their style of financial intermediation, specifically
from the management of transactions costs. To be sustainable, scaling up has to preserve the character
and value of these forms of intermediation. The arguments point to the requirements for knowledge
about clients; knowledge is needed both about their socio-economic condition on joining and on how
that changes as a consequence of their membership in an MFI. These needs can be met through sys-
tematic Social Performance Management.
2 Impact assessment and the MDGs
This paper provides a simple framework for examining impact. There are three main dimensions in
which poverty is addressed through financial service provision. In examining the poverty status of clients
at entry and subsequent poverty reduction impact on clients and their families, we distinguish between
income poverty and all other dimensions affecting clients. The latter are put together under the head-
ing of social impacts. These would include health, education and female empowerment benefits, crucial
to the MDGs, as well as other direct welfare impacts on clients. Very often, these social impacts derive
from the expenditure of additional household income so, at the stage of defining poor households, it is
income poverty that matters.
There is also a third type of impact. Recognising that, as the scale of microfinance programmes grows,
there are wider economic and social impacts, we also need to be concerned with these wider impacts
and their effects on poverty for both clients and non-clients. These can be both economic, largely
through market effects, and social, for example through the influence of microfinance groups on values,
relationships and practices within communities. In practice, it is difficult for MFIs, or anybody else, to
provide a rigorous assessment of these wider impacts but in some circumstances they can be very sig-
nificant.1
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The broader term, ‘social performance’, can be used here, and increasingly is being used rather than
‘poverty’, to refer to these different aspects of MFI performance.2 This framework (Table 2.1) provides
four domains to social performance – Reducing Income Poverty, other Social Impacts on Clients and
Wider Impacts. 
Table 2.1 The domains of microfinance impact
Table 2.1 lists the four impact domains and labels them 1 (A and B) for individual impacts and 2 (A and
B) for wider impacts. Our knowledge of these impacts is limited with most known about 1A and 1B.
Comparing these domains with the MDGs, listed below, it is apparent that the potential impact link-
ages are many. Household-level income (1A) is the domain about which we have most evidence and is
what most people believe to be the main impact domain. Gains in household income contribute most
obviously to the first goal and indeed that goal is measured in terms of dollar a day poverty. Additional
income also contributes to the health and education MDGs. 
The Millennium Development Goals
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Achieve universal primary education
Promote gender equality and empower women
Reduce child mortality
Improve maternal health
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
Ensure environmental sustainability
Develop a global partnership for development
CGAP (2003) have summarised evidence in relation to income, education, health and female empower-
ment; effectively, the terrain of the first six Millennium Development goals. They identify specific MFI
cases where evidence is available to show progress towards the MDGs. They note that, whilst there are
occasional cases of negative impact, by and large the evidence is very supportive of significant MFI
impact against the MDGs. A more detailed study is provided by Morduch and Haley (2002) who com-
pile evidence in relation to the MDGs in a substantial literature review. Their conclusion is that the
MDGs contribute to six of the eight MDGs. The two MDGs that are not treated are environmental sus-
tainability and global partnerships. The latter does not have a target and the former, though it includes
targets on slum improvement and access to safe drinking water, has not been a focus of MFI studies on
these issues.
In addition to income growth, social gains (1B) to clients also arise in two other distinct ways. Firstly,
where the, largely female, clients benefit through better exercise of, and more control over, expendi-
ture choices there is a welfare gain. There are numerous studies on female empowerment related to
MFI service provision and one important element of these is evidence of improvement in expenditure
with more household resources going to health and education. Secondly, many programmes provide
additional training and support services, often in parallel rather than in a closely unified model, that
focus on health, education, production or empowerment for example. The evidence in support of the
welfare gains from these MDG linkages is also strong. Health, education and empowerment linkages
have all been established in a variety of contexts and with different types of institutional partner. 
The distinction between these direct income effects on MDG status of clients and programme-driven
effects on the MDGs is important. The former rest entirely on the consumption expenditure decisions
of clients and presumes that they have an effective choice available to opt for improved health and
education status. The latter depends on a combination of nurturing and education of clients and pro-
gramme activities to ensure social service provision and access. If these latter are important in allowing
Clients and their households Wider impacts
Income Social Social Economic
1A 1B 2A 2B
2 Social performance is used more loosely in other contexts to refer to any aspect of social impact not just that on poverty.
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programme activities to ensure social service provision and access. If these latter are important in 
allowing MFIs to deliver on the MDGs then arguments for ‘lean and focused’ financial services imperil
the future success of MFIs contribution to the MDGs.
The evidence in support of either 2A, wider social impacts, or 2B, wider economic impacts, is much
thinner than either of the two types of direct client impact. As we move from left to right in the table
both the volume of evidence and likelihood of any data establishing causality diminish. However, there is
a growing literature on the role of groups and wider social impacts with a generally, but not wholly,
positive analysis. Both in economic and social aspects, the role of the group has been a focal point of
many studies. A main underlying reason for this is the importance of the group as a vehicle for manag-
ing transactions costs as discussed further below. However, groups formed through MFI 
programmes have also had a socio-political function in promoting the rights of their members, lobbying
for improved access to services and actively organising for the provision of such services.
MFIs can also point to their poverty reduction efforts through the creation of an enabling environment
for private sector growth (B2). By addressing financial market failure, MFIs can allow entrepreneurs to
access investment loans and by providing insurance and savings services they can mitigate the risks asso-
ciated with such borrowing … or indeed any risk to livelihoods. They can argue that increasing the size
of the industry should be the priority because all neglected households including poor households bene-
fit from the financial markets and growth created. Now, whilst we know that, on average, growth
increases income per head of the poor in proportion to increases in mean income per head, there is
substantial variation around this average (Dollar and Kraay 2001). The empirical evidence is clear on this
and the elasticity of the poverty headcount with respect to mean income varies widely (Thorbecke
2004). Not all growth is pro-poor growth and important development objectives, such as the first
MDG on income poverty, may not be best served by neglect of targeted service provision.
Understanding how to achieve poverty reduction through growth is properly the subject of country-
specific micro-research. Likewise, there is no global prescription for achieving poverty reduction through
microfinance service provision. 
The ‘better financial markets to poverty reduction’ argument points to the employment generated
through loans to the non-poor and argues that this employment gives indirect benefits to the poor and
is a substantial source of poverty reduction. Mosley and Rock (2004) provide an argument based on
African data suggesting that, by some poverty definitions, this is likely to be the most important poverty
outreach achievement of MFIs. However, there is no clear evidence that the employment generated
through loans to the better off by MFIs results in employment for the poor. At least one authority
(World Bank, 1999) argues that most of the employment generated is family employment.
Whilst it is clearly true that the main route to income poverty reduction through microfinance provision
is through employment there is little reason to think that large volumes of self-employment by poor
people using their own loans will generate less employment for the poor than loans given to larger
farmers and entrepreneurs who then employ poor people. Indeed evidence on agricultural credit in
India shows that credit has a negative effect on employment. This occurs as a result of loan use to sub-
stitute capital for labour. Capital labour ratios are likely to be smaller (more jobs per unit capital) with
small loans than with large.
Thus, there is little empirical support for the proposition that a purely market-driven expansion of finan-
cial services will allow fulfilment of an MDG mandate through indirect mechanisms associated with
growth. MFIs with a social performance mandate that do not focus on direct poverty outreach are
reduced to relying on the unproven argument that the expansion of financial markets would be inclu-
sive or would generate pro-poor growth. It is a very difficult perspective to reconcile with the use of
scarce public funds earmarked for poverty reduction.
Drawing on this discussion and the framework above, the direct improvement – quality and quantity –
of consumption expenditure is the main way in which the clients of MFIs achieve improvements 
measurable through MDG statistics. This can happen using savings and insurance products leading to
consumption smoothing and reduced vulnerability. The main route though is from the income 
generated by productive use of loans. Whether loans are for household-based businesses or small
enterprises, whether returns on loans are regarded as income or as profits, they are a financing 
instrument and produce financial returns that are of instrumental rather than intrinsic worth. Social
value, as measured by the MDGs, is created when the extra money is used to buy improved 
consumption – better nutrition, more days in school, better health care – rather than when it is saved
or re-invested. The crucial point to note here is that unless the clients are identified as poor at the time
of programme entry then there is no reason for expecting any effect on the first MDG, income poverty
measured by a dollar a day measure. MFIs who have clients that are not income poor will only 
contribute to the achievement of the MDGs when: (1) households are below target on the social and
education MDGs; and (2) they generate additional income that is then used for health and education
expenditures contributing to the MDG targets. Without both knowledge of client condition on entry
and monitoring of their socio-economic status over time, it is not possible to link MFI performance to
MDG attainment.
The evidence on the income dimension is, understandably, stronger than in relation to the other MDGs.
However, this evidence on income gains from MFI services has been subject to critique on both compu-
tational3 and interpretative grounds. In many studies, problems of attribution and of fungibility limit how
well we can compare with the counterfactual though that may not stop the data being useful for other
purposes. The problems of providing sufficient and accurate data are in part because very high standards
of evidence are expected, especially from donors, and for MFIs such standards are difficult. 
Table 2.2 PROMUC Impact Survey in two programmes – differences between the differences in the
first and second rounds
Source: PROMUC, Final Imp-Act Report, ‘Monitoring and Impact Assessment Project for the “La Chanchita”
Community Bank Program’, March, 2004.
One important approach is the ‘difference of differences’ method that compares the size of changes
over time for a control group and a group of clients. Well-designed, as in the Peruvian study providing
the data for Table 2.2 above, they are a relatively reliable source of data. The table is based on the
change over time between the initial value and the new value of a range of variables (range specified)
in two programmes. For each variable, the table shows the difference of the change for the client 
Variables Araiwa Alternativa
Unit/ scale Mean value
of differ-
ences
Significance Mean value
of differ-
ences
Significance
Personal decisions 0–24 0.95 NO 0.95 NO
Decisions regarding partner and chil-
dren
0–3 0.95 (68–80)% -0.7 (68–80)%
Business decisions 0–12 0.72 95% -0.04 NO
Investment
Annual (in
Soles)
-47.6 NO -142.8 NO
Sales
Monthly (in
Soles)
6600.3 (68–80)% 10896.0 (68–80)%
Expenses
Monthly (in
Soles)
5972.3 (68–80)% 10868.0 (68–80)%
Profit
Monthly (in
Soles)
-137.6 NO -1375.6 (68–80)%
Assets
Monthly (in
Soles)
2550.6 95% 2480.5 (68–80)%
Business management quality 0-8 -2.8 95% -2.7 95%
Employees Average -0.08 NO 0.20 95%
Client Income
Monthly (in
Soles)
160.5 95% 149.9 95%
Total Family Income
Monthly (in
Soles)
246.7 95% 290.8 95%
Family income per-capita
Monthly (in
Soles)
56.4 95% 72.7 95%
Household assets 0-28 -0.2 NO -0.5 (68–80)%
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3 For example, the selection of an appropriate control or comparison group, sampling procedures and the quality of data 
collection have all been problematic.
Table 2.3 Summary of some poverty outreach approaches used by Imp-Act partners
group compared to the change for the comparison sample and details the significance level of the dif-
ference. The changes reported here largely relate to the financial performance of the enterprise sup-
ported through the loan and are therefore largely related to the first MDG, but the method is equally
valid with any quantifiable variable.
For this type of study, entry-level data and some limited monitoring data are required yet very few MFIs
either collect or use such data. If they did, they could know the condition of the household, in relation
to specific MDGs, at entry, and their subsequent progress. However, there are very few cases, unlike
the PROMUC table above, where comparable changes over time in relation to income are clearly
analysed. 
The little impact data that is collected is not often directly comparable with MDG targets since those
MFIs that do collect social performance data have other specific uses. The key overall point to note
about this evidence is how thin it is relative to the size of the MFI industry. Table 2.3 illustrates the wide
variety of definitions employed by MFIs to identify their clients. It is apparent from the table that many
MFIs, whatever nominal commitment to poverty reduction they embrace, do not use great precision in
their targeting. In effect, this means that many MFIs are not in a position to know impact against the
MDGs since they do not have credible evidence on the poverty status of their clients at the time of
BosVita, Bosnia-
Herzegovina
Refugees and local population (43% below national poverty line)Refugees and local
population (43% below national poverty line)Refugees and local population (43%
below national poverty line)
BRAC, Bangladesh Targeting through land holding and occupation; women
CAME, Mexico
Geographic; the economically disadvantaged. CAME does not emphasis poverty so
much as exclusion and marginalisation. Their Imp-Act survey suggests that clients
are not among the poorest inhabitants of CAME’s area of operation.
CARD, the
Philippines
Housing, food security, education and assets. Means test form to screen clients on
entry
CERUDEB, Uganda Non-targeted
CMF partner SAC-
COS, Nepal
Geographic
CYSD, India Geographic
FINCA, global No exclusion but targets women (95% plus of their village bank groups)
FINRURAL, Bolivia
Their partners include those e.g. Pro Mujer (Bolivia) who are effective in targeting
poor women in the urban informal sector and Crecer who target poor rural and
urban women…other partners have limited depth of outreach
FOCCAS, Uganda Poor families in rural Uganda
FPC, China Geographic,
K-Rep, Kenya Various groups excluded from formal financial service access.
LAPO, Nigeria Various income-related criteria via Participation Form
ODEF, Honduras
Clients with small and micro-businesses – scored in regulatory assessment of pri-
vate finance institutions
PARTNER, Bosnia-
Herzegovina
Low income and war-affected population (43% below national poverty line)
PRADAN, India Geographic
PRIZMA, Bosnia-
Herzegovina
Poor and low-income women and their families
PROMUC partners,
Peru
Poor women, mainly urban, and targeting poor areas
Pro Mujer, Peru The majority of their clients are female vendors who work in the informal sector.
SEF, South Africa Participatory Wealth Ranking for their targeted programme; women
SHARE, India Targeting through land holding and occupation; women
SAT, Ghana Economically disadvantaged women (primarily, 80%)
UMU, Uganda Self-selection
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joining. For those MFIs that do have good targeting mechanisms and are confident that they are reach-
ing poor households, including perhaps the majority of Indian service providers, assessing achievement
against the MDGs then depends on monitoring client’s socio-economic status over time. Without such
monitoring, the social performance of MFIs, measured by the MDGs or otherwise, is an area of dark-
ness.
The Imp-Act programme is one of several recent initiatives that are helping to establish methods for
MFIs to develop systems that provide the type of information required. One of the key lessons from the
Imp-Act action research is that developing better knowledge about the socio-economic condition of
clients can be a cost-effective investment for the MFIs. This occurs because they can reduce drop out
rates and can improve the relevance and quality of service provision through knowing better what
clients want. However, through the focus on client entry condition and subsequent changes this agenda
goes much beyond market research and is concerned with the social performance of MFIs.
3 Managing the transactions costs of 
microfinance
The challenge is to scale up the provision of services in ways that also seek to maintain and strengthen
the MDG impact. Scale matters and the growth of the industry is seen as important for poverty reduc-
tion and therefore for the achievement of the MDGs. There is a growing momentum within the indus-
try as commercial funders invest in the sector. Reflecting this concern for growth through commercial
partnership those suffering ‘financial exclusion’ are frequently referred to as the clients in the MFI mar-
ket. This term may not be very accurate4 particularly since many MFI delivery mechanisms, especially
member-based institutions, develop out of ROSCAs or other forms of endogenous institutional finance.
Very poor households may not have had access to such institutions but many other households, not just
poor ones, do. It is not clear therefore how well the concepts of poverty and of financial exclusion
overlap. 
This section argues that successful scaling-up requires a clear understanding of how MFIs have addressed
the high transaction costs problem that drove away the commercial banks earlier. Specifically, it focuses
on how these costs are managed through knowledge of clients.
The key development feature of microfinance is in the innovations – in products, terms, transactions
costs and risk – that enabled MFIs to provide financial services where banks had failed. From the earliest
development of these models, in Bangladesh and in Bolivia, these innovations were specifically identi-
fied as means to serve poverty reduction. Initially, they were entirely driven by this more specific agenda
on poverty rather than as a solution to the expensive experience of more generalised failure of rural
financial services; especially the poor performance of the development banks, farmer cooperatives and
directed lending. Their success has led to expansion and to increasing financing needs. It has opened up
linkages with the formal financial sector that had retreated rapidly from rural areas with the advent of
liberalisation in financial markets. Growth -or scaling up, as it is sometimes called- is linked to invest-
ment resources and the financial markets are an obvious source for the MFIs to target. All MFIs face a
pressure to achieve a financial performance that allows them to make this linkage so that they are not
dependent on continuing donor support. 
MFI success has been achieved because, using a variety of institutional models, they have developed
methods to minimise transactions costs. These costs relate to client selection, service provision and the
repayment problem. In various ways, from market research to social embeddedness, MFIs have devel-
oped a means to reduce the riskiness of their portfolio and the costs of running it. For example, the
transfer of loan use monitoring to group members, or the discipline of regular weekly or fortnightly
meetings, result in greater surety and greater knowledge that client loans perform. 
The key problems in past financial failure relate to information costs and how poor information resulted
in problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. MFIs address this through cost effective means of
knowing about their clients. The risk they face, in scaling-up, is that their approach to transactions costs
4 Vijay Mahajan and Bharti Gupta Ramola, ‘Microfinance in India – Banyan Tree and Bonsai’, a review paper for the World Bank, 
August, 2003. See especially the discussion on page 22 showing the multiple and sizeable financial activities of the poor even in 
the absence of commercial banks.
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will be compromised. Rhyne (2002)5 documents the crisis in Bolivia arising from the failure to recognise
this with the growth of consumption loans. In effect, it did not work to use the commercial bank
approach of relatively low customer knowledge and, for large providers, the performance of their con-
sumption loans collapsed. 
Conning (1999) has provided a detailed discussion of the ways in which MFIs manage transactions costs
through the use of groups, through repayment discipline and through the management of the informa-
tion asymmetries that undermined past attempts at rural finance. He recognises that these costs will be
higher when the market segment is the poor. This is because average loan size is typically lower. MFIs
have to trade this off through staff efficiencies and lower default rates. Many MFIs have done this, espe-
cially those adopting the Grameen model or variants of it. Here, staff to client ratios can grow quite
rapidly and a high share of the costs of repayment enforcement is borne by members. This is essentially
true also in the operation of SHGs and in both cases client knowledge or use of agents (other villagers)
with that knowledge is central. The challenge for the MFIs as they seek to grow is the maintenance of
that knowledge and thereby the maintenance of the portfolio quality as client numbers and loan sizes
increase.
Increasingly, access to financial market funds is being achieved. In India, the SHG-commercial banks link-
age programme is an important example, though not without its critiques. Successful MFIs such as
SHARE have developed an institutional structure that allows provision of multiple financial services, bet-
ter financial ratios and thereby access to commercial funds. In India, these funds are in part available as a
response to government encouragement but microfinance is in fact part of a much more general pat-
tern of attempts to develop commercial links with underexploited rural markets. Amongst leading busi-
ness thinkers there is a global push to exploit hitherto neglected market segments; the notion of the
‘poor’ or of ‘rural’ areas in developing countries as market opportunities for international capital is wide-
spread. Within microfinance, there is a more specific appeal to market funds that are directed towards
investment in double bottom line activities. In other words, MFIs are attractive to managers of social
funds because they typically have a social as well as a financial goal.
It is important to recognise that the standards6 used in these northern founded practices bear little
relationship to the MDGs. The Corporate Social Responsibility literature is little different. Specific bond
issues on behalf of the social funds sector are framed very generally with respect to poverty reduction.
This is true also of bonds issued for microfinance. Scaling-up will obviously have access to commercial
finance as a primary driver so the absence of standards relating to poverty (or the MDGs) raises legiti-
mate concerns over mission drift for MFIs.
The core issue around poverty outreach is how a social performance agenda defined in poverty terms
should be realised. The unsurprising answer is that MFIs should target their financial services portfolio to
households defined as poor. That is, the selection of households with specific characteristics that corre-
spond to a MFI’s social mission. We should underline however, that targeting7 can be used in both an
‘exclusionary’ and ‘inclusionary’ way. MFIs can target to exclude those that do not meet a criterion or
they can target to ensure that they include households with some specific characteristics. This is a dis-
tinction between hard and soft targeting; between programmes that have a hard target of only poor
people and those with a softer target of some poor people. The distinction is important because, other
things being equal, lending to poorer people generally costs more. The achievement of financial self-
sustainability becomes slower with exclusionary targeting because average loans are smaller. These extra
costs can be absorbed through improving repayment performance; through staff serving higher num-
bers of clients, acquiring skills in use of targeting instruments and being given incentives to apply them;
and, through gradual increase of services provided, including increases in average loan sizes over time.
With inclusionary or soft targeting, the extra costs of the portfolio of the poor can also be cross-sub-
sidised if necessary with the (potentially) higher profits from loans to the not so poor. This is not 
5 Elisabeth Rhyne, ‘Surviving the Crisis: Microfinance in Bolivia, 1999–2002’, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, Symposium on 
Financial Sector Development in Southeast Europe, November, 2002.
6 An authoritative review of double bottom line accounting is the Double Bottom Line Project Report: Assessing Social Impact in
Double Bottom Line Ventures – Methods Catalog by C. Clark, W. Rosensweig, D. Long and S. Olsen for the Rockefeller
Foundation, 2004.
7 Poverty targeting is sometimes distinguished from poverty screening, the latter term being used for review of client applications 
rather than MFIs themselves selecting clients with specific characteristics. Both involve an assessment of poverty status. We can 
also distinguish these two activities from ‘assessment’ when assessment is used to mean review of poverty status of existing
clients. Screening can be seen as ‘passive’ targeting and assessment as ex post evaluation of targeting success. In all three cases 
the objective includes making a determination of poverty status though the tools used may vary as may the use of the 
information. Other than exceptional circumstances where very detailed poverty information is available about the client 
population, direct targeting is likely to be more cost effective than assessment and more inclusive than screening.
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possible with hard targeting. In both cases, cost absorption and cost reduction practices depend on
organisational efficiency and learning in the use of targeting instruments, product development and
portfolio management. Developing these practices is the core of the social performance management
agenda.
Income poverty is objectively measurable and comparable. These are important characteristics of a social
performance standard. Analysis of other social impacts and wider impacts can then be used to address
all the other dimensions of poverty as part of a more context-specific assessment of organisational per-
formance. In other words when we refer to poverty performance as a standard we are adopting a defi-
nition that will allow comparable measurement of performance. However, income itself is expensive to
measure accurately. Instead, proxy characteristics that are both easy to collect and highly correlated with
poverty are used. In some cases, much of South Asia, these proxies are easily specified in terms of
assets and occupation; in other circumstances it may take some effort to develop them initially. Bosnia
Herzegovina, with poor survey data and a recent history of long disruption from civil war, is a country
where no easy target instruments were available. 
Table 3.1 Prizma poverty scorecard
Prizma work in Bosnia Herzegovina and wanted to improve their knowledge of outreach and ensure
they were reaching their target group. The poverty scorecard they developed, (see Table 3.1) was decid-
ed only after a fairly exhaustive correlation checking process with new survey data on income poverty.
The information covered allows both accurate identification of Prizma’s market segment as well as
monitoring of client progress. By using the scorecard, this MFI will be able to satisfy their clients, their
staff, their board and their funders on the poverty status of their borrowers. Similar initiatives, with a
variety of approaches, were adopted by a number of Imp-Act partners including PRADAN in India as
well as MFIs in the Philippines, South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria.
Poor and Very Poor 0-2   Vulnerable Non-Poor 3–4   Non-Poor 5+
Indicator 0 1 2
Poverty
Risk
Education
What is the education
level of female house-
hold
head/spouse/partner?
≤ Primary > Primary –
Residence
Where is residence?
Rural/Peri
≤ 10,000
Urban
> 10,000
Household
What is household
size? ³ 5 < 5
Change
Household Assets
Does household pos-
sess a stereo CD play-
er?
No Yes
Transport Assets
Does household pos-
sess a transport vehi-
cle?
No Yes
Meat Consumption
On average, how
often does household
consume meat each
week?
Rarely
0–2 times/
week
Sometimes
3–5 times/
week
Often
6+ times/
week
Sweets Consumption
On average, how
often does household
consume sweets with
main meal each week?
Rarely
0–2 times/
week
Sometimes
3–5 times/
week
Often
6+ times/
week
Poverty Status Score (0–9)
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4  Conclusions
In defining outreach strategy, the context-specific analysis of poverty underlining that strategy, is of
paramount importance. The analytic focus on the household and its wellbeing characteristics are of
course common to international statistics and national assessment of poverty. But, in some contexts,
the approach to poverty reduction by service delivery agencies such as MFIs is strongly informed by
structural assessment of poverty causation. In Latin America, such analysis often results in a programme
focus on the informal sector, urban slums and neglected, usually more remote, rural areas. In Eastern
Europe, the recovery from civil conflict and the ‘new’ poverty affecting displaced formal sector workers
during economic and political transition drives targeting strategy. In these contexts, MFIs may perceive
their role as part of broader political processes of engagement with structural conditions underlying
poverty causation. For example, in Bolivia, microfinance has been a focal point of political agitation in
the recent economic crisis. In these contexts, it is clear that direct poverty outreach is only a very partial
assessment of the potential contribution of MFIs to poverty reduction. This is an important caveat to
the argument that direct poverty outreach is the ‘right’ approach to fulfilling an MFI’s poverty reduction
mandate. However, ‘poverty reduction success’ from MFI engagement with economic and social
inequalities8 and exclusion that are structural in nature is necessarily difficult to determine. Without evi-
dence on direct poverty outreach and monitoring client performance such MFIs will have difficulty in
establishing their performance on poverty reduction.
The microfinance industry has embraced the concept of client assessment as a means to strengthen
organisational performance. This has been widely understood as a shift away from a supply or product-
led approach to a demand or market-led approach. Market research has been embraced as a means to
identify client demands and improve the range and relevance of financial products. For MFIs concerned
with poverty outreach, this market research will be of little use if it does not segment the specific
product needs of poor people. The poor represent a market opportunity for MFI services to demon-
strate competitive advantage and commercial value, but to achieve this requires appropriate forms of
client assessment and monitoring.
The additional costs of monitoring impact may not be very high. These costs may even be outweighed
by improvements in product design and service delivery. However, it is well known that targets influ-
ence activities and many MFIs have certainly been persuaded to focus their activities on the financial
sustainability goal despite their avowed commitment to poverty outreach. The challenge for the industry
is to manage scaling-up without losing sight of its social purposes. It is apparent from the discussion
here that good knowledge about MDG impact and successful scaling-up both require knowledge at
client-level. For these two fundamental reasons, developing a social performance monitoring system is
the principal way in which MFI impact on the MDGs can be established and maintained.
8 Inequality is a quite distinct aspect of wellbeing from poverty. Poverty is most sensibly defined in absolute terms of deprivation, 
or what Amartya Sen calls absence of capabilities. Economic or social inequality might be associated with this but even where 
absolute poverty is absent, these inequalities are a source of ill being. It is no fun being relatively poor even if you can afford to 
eat.
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